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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over final judgments of the district courts pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the trial court properly granted Thomas G. Hicks’ (“Hicks”) motion to
vacate the arbitration award on the basis that Hicks was denied his rights to present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses as guaranteed by Utah statute.
Standard of Review: In reviewing a district court’s order vacating an arbitration
award, this Court reviews the district court’s conclusions of law for correctness and
reviews the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See,
e.g., Softsolutions v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095, 1099 (Utah 2000).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
I.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124 (2008) provides:
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the
court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(a) the award was procured by corruption fraud, or other undue
means;
(b) there was:
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
arbitrator;
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a
party to the arbitration proceeding;
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of
sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing
1

contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to substantially prejudice the
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s authority;
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person
participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising an
objection under Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than the
beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the
initiation of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration
proceeding.
II.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116 (2008) provides:
(1) An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in a manner the arbitrary
considers appropriate for a fair and expeditions disposition of the
proceeding. The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power
to hold conferences with the parties to the arbitration proceeding before the
hearing and, among other matters, determine the admissibility, relevance,
materiality, and weight of any evidence.
....
(4) At a hearing under Subsection (3), a party to the arbitration proceeding
has a right to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and
to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.
....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This appeal arises from the district court’s decision to vacate an arbitration award

because Hicks’ ability to present material evidence and cross-examine a key witness was
substantially hindered by the arbitration panel’s (“the Panel”) denial of Hicks’ request for
certain information undisputedly in UBS’s possession.
2

From July 2006 until November 2007, UBS Financial Services, Inc. (“UBS”) and
Hicks arbitrated their dispute arising out of Hicks’ employment with UBS. UBS sought
to recover under two promissory notes signed by Hicks at the time he accepted an offer to
work for UBS. (See Statement of Claim, R. 189-246.) Hicks sought recovery of unpaid
commissions from UBS for his referral to UBS of the companies Extra Space Storage,
Inc. (“Extra Space”) and Infinite Energy Company (“Infinite Energy”). (See Hicks’
Answer to Statement of Claim and Statement of Counterclaim, R. 248-56.) After a
hearing on the matter, the Panel awarded Hicks approximately $161,000 in referral fees
that UBS had failed to pay him and awarded UBS the principal amount of approximately
$647,000 under the promissory notes. (See Amended Award, R. 329.)
In February 2008, Hicks filed a petition and motion to vacate the Award and UBS
filed a petition to confirm the Award. (See R. 6-21; R. 1-12 (Case No. 2321).) On July
8, 2008, the district court issued a memorandum decision (“Memorandum Decision”),
wherein the district court addressed the question of “whether the arbitration panel’s
denial of [Hicks’] request for certain discovery, including deposing a UBS corporate
representative, constitutes a ground for vacating that panel’s arbitration award.”
(Memorandum Decision, R. 373.) The district court granted Hicks’ petition to vacate,
finding that “the panel’s decision hindered [Hicks’] ability to present material evidence
and his ability to adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman, who was clearly a key witness
in the arbitration proceeding.” (Id.)
On September 30, 2008, the district entered an order and final judgment vacating
the Award based on the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision. (See Order and
3

Judgment Vacating Arbitration Award and Directing Rehearing, R. 411-12.) On October
24, 2008, UBS filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 413-15.)
Statement of Facts
1.

On September 14, 2000, UBS hired Hicks as a financial advisor in the Salt

Lake City, Utah branch office. (See Hicks Declaration, R. 23.)
2.

UBS offered Hicks a substantial signing bonus if he would bring his

significant book of business with him and accept an employment position at UBS. (See
id., R. 24.)
3.

Upon accepting the offer, UBS required Hicks to sign certain contracts

including two promissory notes (the “Notes”) that stated if he terminated his employment
with UBS, he would be required to pay back the signing bonus. Hicks was told at the
time that he needed to sign the Notes because that was how UBS handled the signing
bonus for tax and accounting purposes. (See id.)
4.

According to their terms, the Notes were forgivable if Hicks stayed

working for UBS for at least ten years. (See id.)
5.

On February 27, 2006, approximately six years after he was hired, Hicks

left his employment with UBS. (See id.)
6.

Upon Hicks leaving the firm, UBS took the position that he owed it roughly

$650,000 for his alleged breach of the Notes. UBS filed a claim for arbitration to recover
money Hicks allegedly owed it. (See id.)
7.

Hicks filed a counterclaim to recover unpaid commissions from UBS for

his referral to UBS of the companies Extra Space and Infinite Energy, resulting in
4

millions of dollars of work. It was undisputed at arbitration that Hicks referred these
companies to UBS; the only question at issue was how much money Hicks was entitled
to as a result of the work he referred to UBS. (See id.)
8.

During the arbitration proceedings, it became clear to Hicks that any

amount he allegedly owed to UBS on the Notes would be more than fully offset by the
amount he was owed for unpaid commissions for the Extra Space deals and any deals
involving Infinite Energy. Hicks recognized that there most certainly would be
documents evidencing UBS’s business interactions with Extra Space and Infinite Energy.
(See id., R. 25.)
9.

Accordingly, on December 28, 2006, Hicks requested to take the

deposition of a corporate representative knowledgeable about the scope and content of
requested documents regarding UBS’s interactions with Extra Space and Infinite Energy.
(See id.; see also Hicks’s Request for Depositions, R.31-34.) The Panel denied Hicks’s
request. (See Discovery Order dated March 29, 2007, R. 36-38.)
10.

Hicks also requested to take the deposition of Virginia Weisman, UBS

Executive Director, Business Development Group, so that Hicks could better understand
the details of the Extra Space and Infinite Energy deals, and UBS’s referral policy. (See
Hicks’s Request for Depositions, R.31-34.) The Panel denied Hicks’s request to take Ms.
Weisman’s deposition but did direct Ms. Weisman to appear and give testimony at the
evidentiary hearing and to produce all documents in her custody pertaining to the unpaid
commissions due and owing to Hicks. (See Hicks Decl., R. 25; Discovery Order dated
March 29, 2007, R. 36-38.)
5

11.

UBS informed Hicks that there were no documents responsive to his

request regarding any Infinite Energy deals. (See Letter from Hicks to UBS dated Sept.
14, 2007, R. 40.) However, on September 7, 2007, Hicks was notified by Infinite Energy
that it did have documents evidencing a deal between UBS and Infinite Energy. (See
Hicks Decl., R. 25.)
12.

The document produced by Infinite Energy evidences a Term Loan Facility

Commitment Letter between UBS and Infinite Energy dated September 19, 2005 (the
“Infinite Agreement”). (See Infinite Agreement, R. 42-64.) According to the Infinite
Agreement, UBS entered into a financial transaction whereby it would finance Infinite
Energy with seventy-five (75) million dollars to acquire another company. (See id.) The
Infinite Agreement provided for certain fee terms and also provided that UBS would act
as the sole and exclusive advisor, arranger and book manager for the term loan facility
and would exclusively manage the syndication of the term loan facility. (See id.) The
Infinite Agreement was signed by the president of Infinite Energy and by two officers of
UBS: James P. Boland and Warren Jervey. (See id.; Hicks Decl., R. 25-26.)
13.

Hicks never received a referral fee for his role in directing Infinite Energy

to UBS. Under the referral structure that UBS applied to Hicks for his referral of Extra
Space, he stood to receive a commission on the Infinite Agreement of at least $750,000.
(See Hicks Decl., R. 26.)
14.

On October 23, 2007, Ms. Weisman submitted an Affirmation stating,

among other things, that “[b]ased on the search [she] conducted, no responsive
documents exist with respect to any deal involving UBS and Infinite Energy because no
6

such deal was ever completed.” (Weisman Affirmation, R. 66-68.) In her Affirmation,
Ms. Weisman states that she spoke to Christopher Abbate regarding the Infinite Energy
deal, yet she does not state that she even spoke with Mr. Boland or Mr. Jervey about
Infinite Energy – the two UBS officers who signed the Infinite Agreement. (See id.)
15.

In light of Infinite Energy’s production of the Infinite Agreement and Ms.

Weisman’s failure to speak with Mr. Boland or Mr. Jervey about the Infinite Agreement,
UBS most certainly possesses documents that reference the multi-million dollar Infinite
Agreement – such as email and correspondence to, from, and between Mr. Boland, Mr.
Jervey, and Infinite Energy. Other Infinite deals may have existed as a result of Hicks’
referral of the company to UBS but Hicks has no way of knowing this. (See Hicks Decl.,
R. 26.)
16.

The Panel’s decision denying Hicks’ request to take the deposition of a

corporate representative knowledgeable about the scope and content of requested
documents regarding UBS’s interactions with Infinite Energy prevented Hicks from
discovering documents that, in light of the above, are more than likely in the possession
of UBS. And having been denied access to such documents, Hicks was also denied of the
opportunity to use such relevant documents to cross-examine Ms. Weisman regarding her
Affirmation. (See id., R. 27.)
17.

Hicks also requested UBS to produce documents evidencing exactly how

much was made in fees on at least four deals for Extra Space. Some documents were
produced but not all. (See id.)

7

18.

The Panel’s decision denying Hicks’s deposition requests also denied Hicks

the opportunity to determine exactly how much money UBS had received in the business
transactions with Extra Space that UBS alleges to have consummated. If there was more
money received as a result of transactions between UBS and Extra Space, Hicks would
be entitled to a referral fee based on that money. (See id.)
19.

During the arbitration proceeding, UBS alleged to have provided Hicks

with a policy presentation in 2003 that outlined the referral fees that he could expect to
obtain when referring clients to UBS. Hicks never received this policy presentation.
Consequently, Hicks requested the Software Metadata for this 2003 document to
determine whether the document was even created in 2003. UBS never produced this
information even though it was repeatedly requested. (See id.)
20.

Although Hicks had been paid some fees for his referral of Extra Space

while he was employed by UBS, he was not paid what he was rightfully owed; Hicks was
entitled to more fees. (See id., R. 28.) For instance, Hicks was not aware of two other
deals between UBS and Extra Space that UBS admitted at arbitration had in fact taken
place. Moreover, Hicks cannot determine exactly how much he was owed for the first
three deals because he did not have an opportunity to determine what documents existed
relating to fees received by UBS for those deals and simply had to rely upon UBS to
provide piecemeal parts of documents relating to those deals. Hicks was not afforded the
opportunity to depose the agent for UBS who had knowledge of where all of the
documents relating to these deals existed. (See id.)

8

21.

The Arbitration Panel agreed that Hicks was entitled to more fees than UBS

originally paid him. On January 3, 2008, the Arbitration Panel awarded Hicks
$54,445.31 plus interest as compensatory damages for the Extra Space IPO deal, and
$106,682.40 plus interest as compensatory damages on the Extra Space Private Equity
deal. Had Hicks been afforded full opportunity to receive all documents relating to these
deals, he would have received more money from the Panel. (See Panel’s Amendment to
Award, R. 70-77; Hicks Decl., R. 28.)
22.

Including interest, the Panel awarded UBS damages in the amount of

approximately $766,000. (See Panel’s Amendment to Award, R. 70-77.) The amounts
that UBS was directed to pay Hicks – approximately $161,000, plus interest – are to be
off-set against the amounts Hicks owes UBS. (See id., R. 73-74.)
23.

On February 4, 2008, Hicks filed an amended petition and motion to vacate

the Award on the basis that he was denied his rights to present material evidence and
cross-examine witnesses as guaranteed by Utah statute. (See Mem. Supp. Am. Pet. and
Mot. to Vacate Arbitration Award, R. 8-21.)
24.

On July 8, 2008, Judge Faust issued the Memorandum Decision, wherein

he addressed the question of “whether the arbitration panel’s denial of [Hicks’] request
for certain discovery, including deposing a UBS corporate representative, constitutes a
ground for vacating that panel’s arbitration award.” (Memorandum Decision, R. 373.)
Judge Faust stated that “[t]he Court is convinced that in reading the various arbitration
statutes together, discovery decisions which result in the denial of a participant’s rights to
present material evidence, thereby substantially prejudicing that individual, can provide
9

the grounds for vacatur. [UBS’s] reliance on the Buzas case as somehow suggesting
otherwise is misplaced.” (Id., R. 374.)
25.

Judge Faust granted Hicks’ petition to vacate, finding that “the panel’s

decision hindered [Hicks’] ability to present material evidence and his ability to
adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman, who was clearly a key witness in the arbitration
proceeding.” (Id., R. 373.)
26.

On September 30, 2008, the district entered an order and final judgment

vacating the Award based on the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision. (See
Order and Judgment Vacating Arbitration Award and Directing Rehearing, R. 411-12.)
The district court directed that “[t]he rehearing shall be conducted in a manner that will
not again prejudice Hicks’ rights and otherwise comports with Utah Code Ann. § 78B11-116 (formerly 78-31a-116).” (Id., R. 412.) Accordingly, at a minimum, the
arbitration panel on rehearing should allow Hicks to depose a UBS corporate
representative so that he could determine who would have documents regarding the
Infinite Agreement—such as the two officers who signed the agreement—and then
follow-up with additional discovery so that he could fairly present his case. (See id., R.
411-12; Memorandum Decision, R. 373-74.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its brief to this Court, UBS does its best to ignore the heart of the issue in this
case. Namely, UBS fails to adequately discuss the $75 million term loan facility
commitment letter between UBS and Infinite Energy (the “Infinite Agreement”)—an
agreement signed by two UBS officers that was produced during the arbitration by third10

party, Florida company, Infinite Energy. During the arbitration, UBS failed to produce
this decisive document or any other document or email regarding the Infinite Agreement.
It is undisputed that if the Infinite Agreement was indeed consummated, Hicks would be
entitled to a referral fee for his work in directing Infinite Energy, Inc. to UBS—a referral
fee which would have exceeded the total amount awarded to UBS at arbitration. Instead
of producing critical evidence, Ms. Virginia Weisman, a UBS employee, signed an
affirmation stating that there were no deals consummated between UBS and Infinite
Energy and that UBS had no documents in its possession regarding the Infinite
Agreement (an astonishing suggestion given the production of the document by Infinite
Energy, the value of the agreement, and the use of email in today’s business world). Ms.
Weisman, however, admittedly failed to even talk to the two UBS employees who signed
the multi-million dollar Infinite Agreement. Hicks expressly requested the Panel to
require UBS to produce all evidence regarding Infinite Energy and to allow Hicks to
depose a UBS corporate representative so that he could determine who would have
documents regarding the Infinite Agreement—such as the two officers who signed the
agreement—and then follow-up with additional discovery so that he could fairly present
his case. The Panel denied Hicks’ request. For this and other reasons, Hicks was denied
of his rights to present evidence and adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman with
controverting documents. The only evidence at the arbitration regarding whether the
Infinite Energy deal was consummated was Ms. Weisman. Hicks had no way of
presenting any other evidence on this critical issue because UBS stonewalled Hicks and
the Panel regarding this evidence.
11

In light of these facts, it is absolutely no surprise that Judge Faust found that
Hicks’ rights were not respected at the arbitration. Hicks was denied his rights to present
evidence and cross examine witnesses as guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11124(1)(c) and § 78B-11-116. Such a denial of rights unequivocally supports vacating the
Award. But instead of agreeing to return to arbitration where the parties could quickly
resolve the unaddressed issues surrounding the Infinite Agreement, UBS continues to
refuse to recognize Hicks’ rights to fairly present his case. 1
This case presents a perfect example of why the district courts have authority
under specific state statutes to vacate arbitration awards when an aggrieved party is not
allowed to present evidence and cross examine witnesses. Hicks respectfully requests the
Court to deny UBS’s appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT HICKS WAS DENIED
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND ADEQUATELY
CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES DURING THE ARBITRATION
The trial court correctly found that the Panel denied Hicks of his rights under Utah

statute to present evidence and cross examine witnesses. The Panel denied Hicks’
request to require UBS to produce all evidence regarding Infinite Energy and to allow
Hicks to depose a UBS corporate representative so that he could determine who would
have documents regarding the Infinite Agreement. Accordingly, Hicks was denied of his
rights to present evidence and adequately cross-examine Ms. Weisman with
controverting documents. At the hearing, Hicks had no way of presenting any other
1

UBS’s continued and repeated resistance suggests that there is evidence in its possession that UBS is trying
desperately not to provide to Hicks.
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evidence on this critical issue because UBS stonewalled Hicks and the Panel regarding
this evidence. And in light of the Infinite Agreement and the flawed affirmation of Ms.
Weisman, UBS possesses evidence that would significantly impact, if not entirely negate,
the Award. Judge Faust’s order was correct for all of these reasons.
A.

Discovery Decisions Which Result in the Denial of a Participant’s
Rights to Present Evidence or Cross-Examine Witnesses Provide
Grounds for Vacatur

Utah courts can and should vacate an arbitration award if the substantial rights of
the parties were not respected. See Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d
941 (Utah 1996). The Buzas court noted that a court’s review of an arbitration award
“should be limited to the statutory grounds and procedures for review.” Id. at 947. Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c) provides that a court shall vacate an award made in the
arbitration proceeding if an arbitrator “refused to consider evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.” Section 78B11-116(4) dictates that “a party to the arbitration proceeding has a right to be heard, to
present evidence material to the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at
the hearing.”
As was explained by Judge Faust in the Memorandum Decision, when “reading
the various arbitration statutes together, discovery decisions which result in the denial of
a participant’s rights to present material evidence, thereby substantially prejudicing that
individual, can provide the grounds for vacatur.” (Memorandum Decision, R. 374.) The
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-124(1)(c) and 78B-11-116 strongly
13

supports such a statement. A party to an arbitration is guaranteed the rights to present
material evidence and cross-examine witnesses. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11124(1)(c) and 78B-11-116. These statutes make no distinction and provide no carve-outs
regarding the means by which a party was denied his or her rights to present material
evidence or cross-examine witnesses. See id. A party’s rights under these statutes are
either respected, or they are not. See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 946-48.
UBS contends that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-118, regarding an arbitrator’s
discretion with respect to discovery, somehow bars any possible vacatur based on the
denial of discovery, even if the discovery decision resulted in the denial of a participant’s
rights to present material evidence or cross-examine witnesses. (See Appellant’s Br. at
23-24.) This argument is misplaced. Under UBS’s proposed theory, an arbitration panel
could prohibit any and all discovery to one party, while granting broad discovery to the
other party, and the party who was denied any and all discovery would have no basis for
vacating an award against him. Clearly, such a denial of discovery would prejudice the
aggrieved party, and such a process could hardly be deemed fair. Furthermore, a party
who is denied such discovery would likely be denied the opportunity to present material
evidence and adequately cross-examine witnesses. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116.
An arbitrator’s discretion regarding discovery matters is not and cannot be unchecked,
otherwise, the due process protections under Utah law would be critically undermined.
UBS is asking the Court to ignore the controlling Utah statutes and reverse the
district court. The facts and relevant statutes, however, cannot be ignored. Discovery
decisions which result in the denial of a party’s rights to present material evidence and
14

cross-examine witnesses provide the grounds for vacatur. See Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d
at 946-48; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-124(1)(c) and 78B-11-116; Memorandum
Decision, R. 373-74. And in this case, there is no question that Hicks was substantially
prejudiced by the Panel’s denial of his rights to present material evidence and crossexamine a key witness.
B.

Hicks Was Denied His Rights to Present Evidence and Cross-Examine
a Key Witness, Resulting in Substantial Prejudice

Hicks was wrongfully denied access to critical evidence regarding Infinite Energy.
On October 23, 2007, Ms. Weisman submitted an Affirmation stating, among other
things, that “[b]ased on the search [she] conducted, no responsive documents exist with
respect to any deal involving UBS and Infinite Energy because no such deal was ever
completed.” (Weisman Affirmation, R. 68.) Directly contradicting that Affirmation,
however, is the Infinite Agreement produced by Infinite Energy. (See Infinite
Agreement, R. 42-64.) The $75 million Infinite Agreement was not only signed by the
president of Infinite Energy, but was also signed by two UBS officers—James P. Boland
and Warren Jervey. (See id.) Further casting doubt on the validity of Ms. Weisman’s
Affirmation is the fact that Ms. Weisman spoke to Mr. Abbate, and only Mr. Abbate,
regarding the Infinite Energy deal. (Weisman Affirmation, R. 67.) In other words, Ms.
Weisman failed to even speak with the two UBS officers who actually signed the Infinite
Agreement. Common sense establishes that a company that signs a contract worth
around $75 million is likely to have at least some emails, letters, or other written
correspondence addressing such a deal, even if the contract or transaction was never
“finalized” as alleged by Ms. Weisman. The fact that UBS failed to produce a single
15

email or correspondence regarding the deal suggests that UBS is hiding facts.
By denying Hicks access to information that, in light of the above, almost
certainly would lead to the discovery of relevant documents, Hicks was unable to
discover and present material and decisive evidence and adequately cross-examine Ms.
Weisman with controverting documents. See Utah Code Ann. 78B-11-116(4). And
because Hicks would have been entitled to a substantial referral fee for his work in
directing Infinite Energy to UBS, the Panel’s denial substantially prejudiced Hicks. (See
Hicks Decl., R. 26.) Consequently, the Award was rightfully vacated by the trial court.
Hicks was also denied his substantial rights with respect to his request of the
Metadata of a referral fee policy presentation. During the Arbitration proceeding, UBS
alleged to have provided Hicks with a policy presentation in 2003 that outlined the
referral fees that he could expect to obtain when referring clients to UBS. Hicks never
received this policy presentation. (See Hicks Decl., R. 27.) Consequently, Hicks
requested the Software Metadata for this 2003 document to determine whether the
document was even created in 2003. Hicks made repeated requests for this information.
Despite these requests, both to UBS as well as to the Panel, UBS never produced this
information. (See Hicks Decl., R. 27.)
Hicks was denied information that could completely change the outcome of the
arbitration proceeding, and in light of the Infinite Agreement and the flawed affirmation,
there is strong reason to believe that granting Hicks access to the requested information
and allowing him to present that evidence and adequately cross-examine witnesses would
drastically change the Award. In other words, these denials substantially prejudiced
16

Hicks. Accordingly, this Court should deny UBS’s appeal.
II.

UBS PROVIDES NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS FOR OVERTURNING
THE ORDER VACATING THE ARBITRATION AWARD
In addition to the arguments addressed above, UBS asserts arguments for

overturning the appeal based on the limited discovery in arbitrations, the alleged strength
of Ms. Weisman’s affirmation, and Utah’s public policy favoring arbitration. These
arguments all fail.
First, UBS emphasizes the fact that depositions are discouraged at arbitration and
that FINRA arbitrators may permit depositions only in limited circumstances. (See
Appellant’s Br. at 26.) The fact there is generally limited discovery in arbitrations and
the fact that discovery matters rest with the arbitrator is mostly irrelevant to this dispute,
and UBS’ focus on “discovery” is simply misplaced. See Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947; Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c). The issue before this Court is whether the Panel failed to
respect Hicks’ substantial rights under Utah law. See Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947; Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c). As explained above, Hicks was denied the opportunity to
present evidence and cross examine witnesses—rights that are afforded to parties in an
arbitration. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116. There is no dispute that the Panel had
the authority to grant Hicks’ request to depose a UBS representative. And in light of the
Infinite Agreement and the subsequent and questionable affirmation of Ms. Weisman, the
Panel not only had the authority to allow for such a deposition, but the obligation. (See
Infinite Agreement, R. 42-64; Weisman Affirmation, R. 66-68.)
Second, UBS’s argument that Ms. Weisman’s testimony and affirmation somehow
erases all doubt as to whether there was a consummated deal between UBS and Infinite
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Energy fails because (1) there is a signed document between UBS and Infinite Energy
purportedly demonstrating a $75 million deal and (2) Ms. Weisman did not even speak to
the two UBS representatives who signed the document to determine whether there was a
deal consummated. (See Infinite Agreement, R. 42-64; Weisman Affirmation, R. 67-68.)
Common sense establishes that a company that signs a contract worth around $75 million
is likely to have at least some emails, letters, or other written correspondence addressing
such a deal, even if the contract or transaction was never “finalized” as alleged by Ms.
Weisman. (Weisman Affirmation, R. 66-68.) UBS has provided no factual or legal
arguments that would support overturning Judge Faust’s thoughtful decision in this case.
Finally, UBS’s arguments based on Utah’s public policy favoring arbitration rings
hollow when compared to the bedrock principle of due process. (See Appellant’s Br. at
27-30.) It is true that Utah has a public policy favoring “speedy and inexpensive methods
of adjudicating disputes.” Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263,
1268 (Utah 1996). But this public policy in no way trumps a party’s fundamental right to
be heard and present evidence. See Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070,
1075 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that an arbitration must meet the requirements of due
process). The Utah Legislature recognized this fact and provided express statutes
guaranteeing a party to an arbitration the “right to be heard, to present evidence material
to the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-116.
Hicks was denied his rights to present evidence and cross examine witnesses as
guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(c) and § 78B-11-116. Hicks obtained a
piece of critical evidence from a third-party that, on its face, dictates that Hicks should
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have received $750,000 from UBS for referring Infinite Energy to UBS. (See Infinite
Agreement, R. 42-64; Hicks Decl., R. 25-26.) Such a fee completely negates the Award
and may result in Hicks receiving an award against UBS at the rehearing of this matter.
To deny Hicks the opportunity to access and then present documents and depositions
testimony evidence is patently unfair and denies Hicks of his rights as guaranteed under
Utah statute. Such a denial of rights unequivocally supports affirming the trial court’s
vacatur of the Award.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the district court
in this matter.
DATED this _____ day of April 2009.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

/s/ Greggory J. Savage
Greggory J. Savage
Matthew N. Evans
Attorneys for Hicks
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